In the "divide a dollar'' framework of distributive politics among three pivotal groups of unequal size, the paper compares two variants of two-party competition, the objective of a party being the probability of winning (``Majority Tournament'' game) or the expected number of votes ("Plurality'' game). At a mixed equilibrium, all individuals are, on expectation, treated alike in the Plurality Game while the Tournament Game favors individuals in small groups.Cet article se place dans le cadre d'un modèle de pure politique redistributive entre trois groupes d'électeurs. Il compare deux variantes de la compétition électorale entre deux partis, l'objectif d'un parti étant soit la probabilité de victoire ("jeu du tournoi majoritaire"), soit le ...
This dissertation studies game theoretical models for political competition and a class of coordinat...
This paper builds a dynamic model of electoral competition with nonbinding campaign promises. We fin...
Contests are situations in which a set of agents compete for a valuable object, rent or award. The p...
In the "divide a dollar'' framework of distributive politics among three pivotal groups of unequal s...
The paper proposes a theory of ambiguous electoral competition. A platform is ambigous if voters may...
We consider campaign competition in which candidates compete for votes among a continuum of voters b...
We study a scenario where elections are held and two parties, a traditional downsian party and a pa...
My thesis contains essays on voting theory, market structures and fiscal federalism: (i) One Person,...
This paper examines the bargaining over how to combine lists of candidates between rounds of the 200...
This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The novelty of t...
Duverger’s law states that plurality rule tends to favor a two-party system. We study the game-theor...
Udostępnienie publikacji Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego finansowane w ramach projektu „Doskonało...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
Abstract: We study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. T...
In this paper we argue that the number of candidates running for public office, their ideological di...
This dissertation studies game theoretical models for political competition and a class of coordinat...
This paper builds a dynamic model of electoral competition with nonbinding campaign promises. We fin...
Contests are situations in which a set of agents compete for a valuable object, rent or award. The p...
In the "divide a dollar'' framework of distributive politics among three pivotal groups of unequal s...
The paper proposes a theory of ambiguous electoral competition. A platform is ambigous if voters may...
We consider campaign competition in which candidates compete for votes among a continuum of voters b...
We study a scenario where elections are held and two parties, a traditional downsian party and a pa...
My thesis contains essays on voting theory, market structures and fiscal federalism: (i) One Person,...
This paper examines the bargaining over how to combine lists of candidates between rounds of the 200...
This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The novelty of t...
Duverger’s law states that plurality rule tends to favor a two-party system. We study the game-theor...
Udostępnienie publikacji Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego finansowane w ramach projektu „Doskonało...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
Abstract: We study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. T...
In this paper we argue that the number of candidates running for public office, their ideological di...
This dissertation studies game theoretical models for political competition and a class of coordinat...
This paper builds a dynamic model of electoral competition with nonbinding campaign promises. We fin...
Contests are situations in which a set of agents compete for a valuable object, rent or award. The p...